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ABSTRACT
After outlining characteristics of Japan's distribution sector, a comprehensive international
comparison of it to those of other nations is presented and analyzed for underlying differences. This
leads to an explanation of Japan's retail store density, which is then related to the structure of
wholesale channels. Next, some details on the Large Store Law of Japan and regulatory distortion,
including empirical evidence on its extent are offered. Data on the structure of the retail sector by
store format and on differences among prefectures in density and format are then presented.
David Flath 
Department of Economics 
North Carolina State University 
Raleigh, NC 27695-8110 
david_flath@ncsu.edu  Japan's distribution sector employs about one-sixth of the nation’s labor 
force and accounts for around one-eighth of GDP, large enough to matter for any 
economy-wide assessment of barriers to growth and efficiency.  Moreover, the phrase 
“inefficient distribution” has been repeated so many times in reference to Japan 
that one might suppose the evidence of gross distortion is overwhelming.  It is not.   
  Certainly regulatory limits on large stores have had an effect on the numbers 
of  stores  of  differing  formats,  but  the  undeniable  peculiarities  of  Japan’s 
distribution  sector  can  be  explained  by  fundamentals:  car  ownership,  size  of  dwelling, 
and geography. Accounting for such fundamentals explains much of the variation in 
retail  density  between  Japan  and  other  countries,  as  well  as  across  prefectures  within 
Japan. Moreover, changes in these factors can be related to changes in the structure 
of retailing.
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  This paper does three things.  First, it compiles facts on the state of 
Japan's distribution system and puts them in historical and international context.  
This includes an explanation of retail store density and its relation to wholesale 
channels. Second, the chapter describes the logical framework behind the still widely 
held view that regulation, in particular the Large Store Law (repealed in 2000), is 
the key determinant of the structure of Japan’s distribution system, and derives 
some testable predictions about what this implies.  Third, it provides new evidence 
on whether the testable predictions are true.  This includes looking at differences 
among prefectures and over time in retail density and format. 
 
 
1  Characteristics of Japan’s Distribution Sector 
 
The peculiarities of Japan’s distribution sector include the myriad of small stores 
and  lack  of  large  stores,  multiple  wholesale  steps,  and  ubiquity  of  vertical 
restraints.  Some relevant data are in Table 1. 
  In the late 1990s Japan had 11 stores per thousand inhabitants, almost twice 
the US, and four times the UK, levels.  The typical US supermarket in 2000 was almost 
five times the size of a Japanese equivalent, which was not quite the size of two 
basketball  courts.  Many  stores  in  Japan  are  family  enterprises  with  even  smaller  floor 
space.  The average number of workers per store in Japan is half the US figure. 
  Fragmentation  of  the  retail  sector  in  Japan  is  accompanied  by  long  and  complex 
wholesale marketing channels.  This is evident in several statistics.  Japan’s 
distribution sector employment is disproportionately concentrated in wholesaling 
compared to the United States, and the fraction of wholesalers’ revenue from sales 
to other wholesalers is much higher in Japan. 
  Finally,  the  ubiquity  of  manufacturer-imposed  pricing  rules,  customer 
assignments, and stipulations of exclusivity can be judged from the large fraction 
of wholesalers reporting participation in manufacturer-initiated “distribution 
keiretsu”: 45% in 1992, although this is down from 70% in 1986 (Chusho-kigyo-cho 
1994, p 180 table 9).  No direct comparison with the United States can be made, but 
such practices frequently run afoul of US antitrust laws and thus undoubtedly are 
less widespread. 
                                                  
1 Other investigators who argue that factors besides regulation are important in discussions of 
Japan's  distribution  system  include  Nariu  (1994),  Maruyama  et  al  (1991),  and  Miwa  and  Ramseyer  (2002). 
For an overview of my work and that of some other scholars, see Flath (2000, ch 14).  
 
2  International Perspective 
 
This  section  presents  a comprehensive comparison  of Japan’s  distribution sector  with 
those of other nations. Table 2 depicts statistics for OECD countries on density of 
retail stores, employment per store, and value-added and employment in wholesaling 
and retailing. 
  The  countries  are  listed  in  ascending  order  of  stores  per  thousand  inhabitants 
in the mid 1990s.  Japan is in the bottom third of the list, having moved up since 
1982 when it had 14.3 stores per thousand. 
  A  simple  index  of  the  average  productivity  of  labor  employed  in  the 
distribution sector relative to the average productivity of labor in the overall 
economy can be obtained by dividing the share of distribution sector value-added in 
GDP by the share of distribution sector employment in the total labor  force.  Countries 
with higher standards of living (relatively high GNP per person in PPP units) tend 
to have wider discrepancies in average labor productivity between distribution and 
other sectors. (The United States is a regression outlier, but Japan is not). This 
has  a  simple  interpretation:  it  reflects  the  generally  slower  pace  of  technical  change 
in services compared to manufacturing, something first noted by William Baumol.
2 
  Japan’s index stands at 0.69, which is below the 0.75 average for all the 
countries. This is expected, given high standard of living. (The United States does 
not  fit  the  pattern;  its  index  of  0.92  is  above  the  international  average.)  The  upshot 
is that the variation in the index across countries probably is more reflective of 
international  differences  in  average  productivity  of  manufacturing  than  of 
distribution. 
  Countries with lower standards of living tend to have more stores per person, 
and smaller average store size (measured as average employment per store). The 
association many have made between Japan’s ubiquity of small stores and economic 
backwardness is based on this pattern. 
 
 
3  Explaining Retail Store Density 
 
There are two broad types of economic model for explaining the overall density of 
retail stores, those that presume the density of stores attains the economic optimum 
but without explicitly modeling how prices  are set, and those that presume the density 
of stores is the maximum consistent with positive profits given some explicit model 
of pricing by firms.  Flath (1990) and Matsui and Nariu (2001) adopt the social 
optimality approach. Heal (1980) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) model pricing 
explicitly and presume free entry. 
  The comparative statics of store density are qualitatively the same for both 
types  of  model.  A  proliferation  of  stores  shifts  some  costs  of  storing  and  transporting 
goods from households to the distribution sector. 
                                                  
2 A simple OLS regression of the natural logarithm of the labor productivity index (for 1996-97) 
on the natural logarithm of GNP per person measured in purchasing power units (for 1998) is: 
ln (Index) =  4.1 - 0.45 ln (GNP per person in PPP units) 
(t-stat = -3.8); number of observations = 20; R2 = 0.44.   Thus,  it is appropriate to base  empirical  analysis of  international  variation 
in retail density on factors associated with the costs of transporting and storing 
goods of both households and firms.  This is exactly the approach taken by Flath and 
Nariu (1996) using data from the early 1980s.  Here that exercise is repeated with 
more recent data. 
  Table  3  presents  data  on  some  variables  associated  with  the  costs  and  benefits 
of a proliferation of stores for various OECD nations, mostly from around 1996. The 
variables are proxies for things that affect the relative efficiency of households 
and firms at storing and transporting goods. 
  Crowded living space (CRWDNG) increases willingness to pay a premium to shop 
nearby. Car ownership (CARS) lowers household costs of shopping, and thus lowers the 
premium. The more urbanized an economy (URBAN), then, for any given expansion in the 
number of stores per person, the smaller the effect on the average distance between 
stores  and  residences,  and  so,  the  smaller  marginal  benefit  from  proximity.  If  a  nation 
is geographically compact (LENGTH) like Japan, rather than dispersed over half a 
continent like the United States, the added costs of restocking a multiplicity of 
stores is reduced.  A proliferation of trucks (TRUCKS), and the infrastructure of 
roads that make it worthwhile to use trucks, lowers the added costs of restocking 
a multiplicity of stores as opposed to a smaller number of larger ones. 
  Table 4 shows that all of these contribute to the cross-country variation 
in number of stores per person in the expected way. The estimates in the first two 
columns include as an explanatory variable the average number of persons per room, 
a proxy for the dearness of household storage space. This variable is available only 
for some of the countries.  Excluding it, and thus enlarging the sample, narrows the 
standard errors of estimates of the other coefficients. This possibly reinforces 
confidence that the results are qualitatively valid. 
  Japan is not a regression outlier. Stores per thousand persons predicted by 
regressions excluding Japan are 11.8 with crowding and 11.7 without, statistically 
indistinguishable from the actual value of 11.3. These results very much resemble 
those obtained in Flath and Nariu (1996) for a slightly different set of countries 
using data from around 1980. 
  The  conclusion remains that  Japan’s  relatively high density  of  retail stores 
is due to its paucity of private cars, confined household living space, geographic 
centricity, and super-abundance of trucks. 
  All of this pointedly leaves regulation out of the picture. Partly this 
reflects the lack of a suitable proxy for regulation that can be included in the 
regression equation.  But it also reflects a judgement that regulation is a corollary 




4  Wholesale Channels 
 
The focus so far has been on the density of stores.  A related issue is the extent 
to which Japan's complex wholesale marketing channels are induced by its high retail 
store density, as opposed to reflecting some idiosyncrasy. 
  Proliferation  of  stores  induces  branching  of  logistical  arteries  to  economize 
on transport costs.  Such branching does not by itself imply a multiplicity of 
wholesale steps, but would seem to lower the costs of a profusion of wholesalers.   Evidence suggests Japan’s high retail density and wholesale complexity are 
intertwined.  Nariu and Flath (1993) construct estimates of the average number of 
steps in matched wholesale industries of Japan and the United States for the early 
1980s.  Besides confirming that Japanese wholesale channels have on average more 
steps (1.8) than US ones (1.4), we also showed that the variation in number of steps 
across wholesale marketing channels is highly correlated between Japan and the United 
States, and for consumer products is also related to the relative density of stores.
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  In other words, there are common influences operating on the length of 
wholesale channels in both countries.  Also, the number of wholesale steps in Japan 
is greater for products (such as food) that have particularly many retail stores 
compared to the United States.  This suggests that Japan’s elephantine wholesale 
sector is to some extent due to its proliferation of stores. 
 
 
5  The Large Store Law 
 
The regulation that bears most directly on the density of retail stores in Japan is 
the Large Store Law.  It is the essential reason why Japan, at least historically, 
has far fewer department stores and general merchandise super stores, and far more 
of most other kinds of stores, per person than the United States. McCraw and O'Brien 
(1986) were early recognizers of this. 
  Bureaucratic obstacles have been placed on establishment of large stores 
since the Department Store Act of 1937. Suspended in 1947 but reinstated in 1956, 
it required approval of the national government for the opening of new department 
stores anywhere in Japan.  In 1974 the Large Scale Retail Store Law replaced the 
Department Store Act.  It made the extent of floor space, rather than the nature of 
the store, the criterion for necessitating approval.  The cut-off was 3000m
2 in the 
largest cities and 1500m
2 everywhere else. At the time, almost all stores larger than 
the cut-offs were department stores.  In 1978 the law was completely revamped to 
broaden coverage to include all new stores over 500m
2, which meant it would apply to 
many grocery stores. 
  The process of securing approval to open a large store was torturous, 
typically requiring two years or longer.  The process, directed by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), involved hearings before local panels that 
included owners of existing stores that would suffer if the proposal was approved.  
The panels tended either to recommend against approval or propose restrictions on 
the hours or days the store could operate.  In many cases they proposed such onerous 
requirements  as  requiring  offering  of  classes  in  cultural  activities  such  as 
calligraphy or floral arrangement at prices that did not cover costs.  MITI tended 
to adopt these recommendations and proposals.  Larke (1994) offers further detail 
on the process. 
  Unsurprisingly, following adoption of the 1978 amendments, applications to 
                                                  
3 In Nariu and Flath (1993, p 94 table 6-3) we present an OLS regression. 
Number of steps in Japanese wholesale industry = 
0.30 + 
0.60 (number of steps in matching US wholesale industry) + 
0.09 (stores per household in Japan divided by stores per household in 
in the US for retail category corresponding to the wholesale industry). 
(t-stat = 4.1), (t-stat = 3.3); number of observations = 24; R2=0.57. open new stores dropped to a trickle: in 1984 there were fewer than 500. 
  In 1989, the US government identified the Large Store Law as a "structural 
impediment"  to  the  sale  of  US-made  consumer  products  in  Japan,  arguing  in  negotiations 
with Japan for repeal or relaxation of the law.  Japan responded first by amending 
the law in 1992 to shorten the process for reviewing applications then, in 1994, by 
raising the cut-off to 1000m
2, which is about one fourth the size of the typical US 
grocery store. 
  As shown in Table 5, the number of large stores in operation did increase 
after 1994.  However the overall number remains low compared to the United States. 
In 1997 there were only around 24,000 stores in all of Japan larger than 1000m
2. 
  In May 1998, the Diet replaced the old law with a new one (actually with three 
new laws) that place details of the regulation of large stores under control of 
prefectural governments but mandates that they consider only environmental factors 
such as noise and traffic, not any economic harm to incumbent owners of small stores.  
The line between environmental factors and economic ones is sufficiently fuzzy that 
some prefectures may actually enact more severe restraints than existed under the 
previous regime (though I consider this unlikely).  Other prefectures may remove the 
restraints on large stores altogether. 
 
 
6  Regulatory Distortions 
 
Regulatory distortions definitely exist in Japan’s distribution sector. Table 6 
summarizes them. 
  The  sparseness  of  large  stores  clearly  is  the  result  of  regulations. 
Restricting the number of large stores may have had a secondary, distorting effect 
on Japan’s foreign trade insofar as imported consumer products until the 1990s were 
mostly  products  more  effectively  distributed  through  large,  upscale  department  stores 
such as Mitsukoshi and Takashimaya. 
  The multiple wholesale steps and disproportionately large employment in 
wholesaling may in large part also be a secondary effect of the proliferation of small 
stores, and thus an indirect result of regulatory protection of small stores.  For 
example, Nariu and Flath (1993) offer a regression equation linking multiplicity of 
wholesale steps and proliferation of stores. 
  Regulations regarding inward foreign direct investment (FDI) may have had 
a relatively large effect on distribution.  A disproportionately large share of FDI 
in Japan (and elsewhere) is in wholesaling.  Japan’s vanishingly small stock of 
inward FDI in comparison with the United States and EU has been linked to Japanese 
government  restrictions  relaxed  around  1980.    The  relative  absence  of 
foreign-affiliate  wholesalers  in  Japan  could  inhibit  competition  and  protect 
inefficient  domestic  incumbent  producers  and  distributors.  (For  a  close  investigation 
of FDI in  Japan’s wholesale industry and its effects on import penetration,  see Flath 
2001.) 
  Enforcement also matters. Vertical restraints are often presumptively in 
violation of the antimonopoly law of Japan, but they nonetheless appear to be 
widespread.  Penalties for violations are notoriously weak and the resources devoted 
to enforcement are quite parsimonious. 
  Large stores do not necessarily compete only with small ones: they also 
complement them, perhaps offering agglomeration economies.  In other words, there are possible negative effects on small stores from regulatory limits on large ones.  
Empirical analysis is needed here. 
 
6.1  Evidence Regarding Regulatory Distortion 
 
As a first pass at assessing whether the distorting effects of these regulations might 
be significant, consider some data from McKinsey Global Institute (2000). The authors 
construct estimates of value-added per hour of labor across stores of different kinds 
in Japan and the United States in the mid 1990s.  They conclude that traditional 
“papa-mama” stores in Japan have lower average labor productivity than do large 
stores in Japan and that they account for a disproportionately large share of total 
labor input compared to the United States (Table 7). 
  Overall average labor productivity in Japan’s retail sector is only about 
half that of the United States.  Closing that gap would increase Japan’s GDP 
measurably.  How  much?  Here  is  a  rough  calculation.  Suppose,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that only regulatory barriers limit the number of general merchandise stores and 
supermarket groceries, and that eliminating those barriers would double the labor 
hours that each group employed in 1997 (to roughly match the US pattern), shifting 
workers from traditional stores.  Also suppose that as this occurred, value-added 
in  traditional  stores  fell  in  proportion  to  the  withdrawal  of  labor,  while  value-added 
in other stores remained unchanged as wages displaced their profits.  Each year this 
would eliminate a deadweight loss equal to about 0.25% of Japanese GDP.
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  Now suppose further that as a result of the changes in retailing, Japan’s 
wholesale sector also evolved to more resemble US wholesaling in terms of labor 
productivity.  Employment would fall by 2% to 4% of the labor force, freeing millions 
of workers for employment elsewhere in the economy. 
  If this thought experiment holds any validity, the distortions afflicting 
Japan’s distribution sector are enormous.  But the calculation is highly suspect. 
  Set aside the obvious difficulties in measuring labor hours and productivity 
in small, family-operated stores.  The calculation accepts that any differences 
between Japan and the United States in allocation of labor across store types and 
between the retail and wholesale sectors are wholly the result of distortions and 
could be eliminated by an act of government policy.  If this were true, then large 
stores of Japan ought to be immensely profitable.  They are not. The bankruptcies 
of the Sogo department store chain and MyCal supermarket chain are reminders of this 
fact. 
 
6.2  Vehicle Inspections 
 
Although the analysis to follow suggests that the distorting effects of the Large 
Store Law may have been less than often supposed, it also indicates that regulations 
not specifically focused on that sector may have a distorting effect.   Regulations 
that unnecessarily or wastefully increase the cost of owning and operating a private 
                                                  
4 If labor hours in general merchandise stores and supermarkets doubled from the 1997 levels with 
no change in value-added (as wages displaced profits), value-added per hour would fall by half in 
each.  The deadweight loss thus eliminated equals the area of a Harberger triangle with right sides 
equal to the initial labor hours and half the initial value-added per labor hour.  In other words, 
the recovery of deadweight losses amounts to about 25% of initial value-added:  0.25(2.2+3) = 1.3 
trillion yen, which is around 0.25% of Japan’s GDP. car indirectly favor small stores over large ones by enhancing household willingness 
to pay for proximity to stores. 
  Japan does indeed have such a regulation, the requirement that private car 
owners submit their vehicles to comprehensive inspections every two years beginning 
with the car’s third year on the road.  These vehicle inspections (shaken, in 
Japanese) are made unnecessarily expensive by the limited number of shops licensed 
to conduct them and by the onerous requirement that numerous working parts be replaced 
if an older car is to pass (Beck 1993).  This is widely cited as the reason why the 
average vehicle age in Japan is 5.8 years compared to 8.3 years in the United States, 
and the average annual mileage per car in Japan is only about half that of the US 
(JETRO 2002). 
  As recently as 1990 Japan had a mere 291 cars per thousand persons. As a first 
pass at assessing whether increasing car ownership may have run its course, consider 
a simple regression of cars per thousand persons on GNP per person in purchasing power 
units,  using  1998  data.  The  predicted  value  for  Japan  is  450.1,  while  the  actual  number 
is 395.1. The 12% difference is not statistically significant.
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  My guess is that a further dramatic increase in car ownership in Japan is 
unlikely, but a lagged response of retail structure to the past increase in car 
ownership may still play out over the coming decade and beyond.  
 
 
7  Retail Formats 
 
Japanese statistics define eight store formats (Table 8). Format is determined by 
whether a store is self-service and by the mix of merchandise it offers in three broad 
categories (clothing, food, and living (jun-kanren)). 
  Large stores are primarily department stores, general merchandise super 
stores, and specialty super stores. Similarly, these formats tend to be large stores.  
The essential difference between general merchandise super stores and department 
stores is that the former are self-service stores while the latter are not. 
  Table 9 provides time-series on the numbers and average scale of stores in 
each format. Note the 1997 changes in the definitions of specialty super stores and 
convenience stores. Before 1997, the specialty super store category included stores 
larger than 500m
2, which meant they were all subject to the Large Store Law. Then, 
stores as small as 250m
2 were reclassified from other super stores to specialty super 
stores if  their  product-mix  concentration  met  the  specialty requirement.  This tripled 
stores in the category.  Department stores and general merchandise super stores have 
decreased in number from 1997 to 1999, their travails documented in numerous news 
accounts. 
  There is no category for small family-owned stores as such: most are either 
specialty or semi-specialty stores. Two-thirds of them are sole proprietorships.  
Only 5% of specialty super stores are sole proprietorships and no large stores is. 
  Between  5%  and  10%  of  specialty  and  semi-specialty  stores  are  contained  within 
the premises of large stores (that is boutiques within larger stores).  The total 
                                                  
5 The log linear OLS regression is: 
ln (cars per thousand) = 
-2.9 + 0.9 ln (GNP in PPP units) - 0.13 (dummy equal to one for Japan) 
(t-stat = 6.6) (t-stat = 0.5); number of observations = 26; R2 = 0.65. number of such stores (not themselves large but, contained within the premises of 
ones that are large) has remained around 100,000 since 1991. 
  Table  10  shows  the  time-series  for  composition  of  total  sales  across  the  types 
of store.  These data reflect the same trends in numbers of stores. 
 
7.1  Influences on the Number of Stores by Format 
 
The Large Store Law has limited the number of stores with large floor space.  Almost 
all of these are department stores, general merchandise super stores, or specialty 
super stores.  The law also ought to have induced increased numbers of stores of other 
formats. These include small family-owned, non-self service stores that are mostly 
classified as specialty stores or semi-specialty stores.  Our next task is to measure 
these effects. 
  In measuring the effect of regulatory change on the number of stores, it is 
necessary to control for changes in other factors influencing retail density. These 
include increasing ownership of passenger cars, increasing average space per person 
in dwellings, and declining population density in cities as the suburbs expand. 
Increasing car ownership favors evolution towards a retail sector with fewer, larger 
stores.  Declining  population  density  per  se  has  the  opposite  effect  on  retail  density 
but is probably itself an inevitable accompaniment of the move toward car ownership 
and  larger  dwellings.    All  three  trends  can  be  placed  under  the  heading 
"suburbanization".  Tables 11, 12, and 13 document them. 
  More living space means that storage space is less constrained, enabling 
households  to  shop  less  frequently  for  daily  necessities  and  to  maintain  larger  stocks, 
eroding the value to households of proximity to stores selling nondurables.  The 
effect of larger, less crowded dwellings on the numbers of stores selling durables 
is  possibly  the  opposite,  leading  to  more  such  stores.  But  stores  selling  nondurables 
such as food and daily necessities are more numerous than the ones selling durables 
such as furniture. 
  As population density becomes less, the marginal benefit to households of 
a  proliferation  of stores  becomes  greater.  This  effect arises because,  as  households 
are more diffuse, any given number of stores per household entails a greater average 
distance from each household to the nearest store, and the reduction in that distance 
with each given increase in number of stores becomes correspondingly greater.  See 
Flath (1990) for an algebraic treatment of this phenomenon.  The point here is that 
the  gradual  decline  in  average  population  density  that  has  accompanied  the 
proliferation of cars and increased spaciousness of dwellings has possibly in and 
of itself slowed the push towards fewer, larger stores in Japan. 
 
 
8  Results from Analyzing Prefectural Differences 
 
Regulatory effects should  vary among  prefectures  because,  although a national  statute, 
the Large Store Law was implemented through locally administered advisory panels in 
each municipal jurisdiction. To measure these regulatory effects, I ran a set of 
regressions (detailed in Box 1). The results are in Table 14. 
 
 
 Box 1  Prefectural Regressions 
To explain the numbers of stores per person of different kinds, I ran OLS regressions 
using  data  for  each  of  Japan’s  47  prefectures  from  five  consecutive  Census  of  Commerce 
of Japan (1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997). The dependent variable is the natural 
log of the number of stores per 1000 persons.  There is a different equation for each 
different format of store and for all stores. 
  The independent variables are the same in each equation and as in Matsui and 
Nariu (2001) include a dummy variable for each prefectures. I do not report the 
estimates of coefficients on these dummies. 
  The independent variables of interest include the natural logs of the three 
variables being discussed, observed for each prefecture: passenger cars per 1000 
persons,  dwelling  floor  space  per  person,  and  1000  persons  per  km
2  in  densely  inhabited 
districts.  To further control for the diffusion of population, I included the 
fraction of each prefecture’s population residing in densely inhabited districts.  
It was necessary to log linearly interpolate between, or extrapolate from, housing 
census years and population census years respectively.  Annual data are available 
for passenger car registrations. 
  The natural logarithms of the number of Class 1 large stores and of Class 
2 large stores are included to measure the severity of regulation of large stores.  
So, for example, after 1994, large stores with floor space between 500m
2 and 1000m
2 
were automatically approved by MITI, but in the Census of Commerce these were still 
classified as “large stores”. 
 
  An examination of the first column estimates in Table 14 reveals that car 
ownership and urban population density have influenced the overall density of stores 
in  the  expected  way.    Disappointingly,  size  of  dwelling  has  not  exerted  a 
statistically significant effect on overall density of stores (nor a coherent effect 
on numbers of stores of particular formats). 
  The number of Class 1 large stores (floor space of 3000m
2 or more, except in 
the  central  parts  of  major  cities  where  it  is  6000m
2  or  more,  and  a  proxy  for  regulation) 
has no measurable effect on the overall number of stores.  However, the density of 
Class 2 large stores (those that are not class 1, and another proxy for regulation) 
is, as expected, inversely related to the overall number of stores.  Possibly this 
reflects the much greater temporal variation in the number of Class 2s than in Class 
1s (shown in Table 5). 
  All  of  the  variables,  including  the  number  of  Class  2s,  have  inelastic  effects 
on the overall number of stores. Over the period 1985-97 the number of Class 2s grew 
about 5% per year, while the overall number of stores shrank about 1.1%. Given the 
estimated elasticity of overall number of stores with respect to number of Class 2s 
of -0.10, expansion of these large stores by itself accounts for a little less than 
half of the constriction in overall number of stores. 
  Relaxed regulation is a contributing factor to reduction in number of stores, 
slightly less important than increasing car ownership.  The inelasticity of overall 
number of stores with respect to number of (Class 2) large stores (=-0.10) generally 
argues against regulatory limits on large stores as being in any way crucial in 
explaining  the  proliferation  of  small  stores.    For  example,  quadrupling  or 
quintupling the number of class 1 and class 2 stores would roughly match the density 
of such stores per person in the United States, but based on these estimates would 
still not dramatically reduce the overall number of stores in Japan.   If regulation mattered greatly, one would expect that in prefectures where 
the large store law was more loosely applied, overall retail density would be 
dramatically smaller than elsewhere.  This does not appear to have been the case. 
  Fundamentals, including those embedded in the prefecture by prefecture fixed 
effects,  account  for  far  more  of  the  variation  in  overall  density  of  stores  both  across 
prefectures and over time than does the regulatory-determined number of large stores. 
  The influences of the regulation variables and car ownership on density of 
stores of each format further instill confidence in the economic model underlying 
the specification and the interpretation of results just offered.  The positive 
influence of the regulation-determined number of Class 1 large stores on the number 
of department stores is evident, as is the positive influence of the number of Class 
2 large stores on the number of general merchandise super stores and specialty super 
stores.  This comports with the fact that most of the department stores have very 
great floor space and so are in Class 1. 
  Car ownership is generally undercutting specialty stores and semi-specialty 
stores and promoting convenience stores, department stores and self-service (that 
is, super) stores of all kinds.  The very large and positive influence of increasing 
car ownership on the number of convenience stores may be an important reason for their 
recent very rapid growth. 
  The size of the effect of car ownership on overall number of stores shown 
in  Table  11  (elasticity=-0.17)  is  quite  a  bit  less  than  in  the  cross-country  regression 
of Table 4 (elasticity =-0.3) (The larger coefficient estimate, -0.6, from Table 4 
is perhaps biased by exclusion of the variable CRWDNG pertaining to size of dwelling.)  
There is a simple explanation for this: The regulatory limit on the number of large 
stores in Japan is dampening the response of number of stores to increasing car 
ownership. 
  If this is true, then it suggests a way of quantifying the likely ultimate 
effect of  deregulation on the overall number of stores: It might be roughly equivalent 
to the effect of doubling the responsiveness of overall numbers of stores to increased 
car ownership from an elasticity of 0.17 to 0.30.  That is, one might expect the 
overall number of stores in Japan ultimately to fall by about 15% from its 1997 level 
(11.3 per thousand persons) to around 9.6 per thousand. 
  The  picture  that  emerges  is  one  that  matches  the  earlier  analysis  of 
international data; regulatory distortions account for little in explaining Japan’s 
high density of stores. 
 
 
9  Conclusion 
 
The  Japanese  distribution  sector certainly exhibits  peculiarities. It  has  vastly more 
stores per person than most other rich countries.  It also has particularly complex 
wholesale  marketing  channels,  with  multiple  steps  and  ubiquitous  vertical  restraints.  
This chapter has explored the reasons and found them to relate more to economics than 
to regulation. It also has shown how the peculiarities are complementary. 
  Scarcity of living space and the inconvenience of owning and operating a car 
has enhanced Japanese households' willingness to pay for nearby shopping.  Japan's 
geographic centricity has facilitated development of a transport system and complex 
logistical arteries that lower the costs of continually restocking the many retail 
outlets.  These factors combine to make a proliferation of stores in Japan not only inevitable but efficient.  Given this, regulations protecting small stores from 
competition by large ones  (mostly  in  the  form  of the  Large  Store  Law  and its  successor, 
the Large Store Location Law) imply only minor economic distortions and encounter 
little  effective  political  resistance.    But  as  car  ownership  has  grown,  the 
distorting effects of regulations limiting large stores have become greater and 
politically less tenable. 
  A  proliferation  of  small  stores  increases  the  economic  advantages  of 
logistical  arteries  with  many  branches,  which  in  turn  lowers  the  costs  of  a 
multiplicity of wholesale steps.  The implied ubiquity of retailers and wholesalers 
increases the horizontal externalities that arise in promoting and marketing goods 
and that are the target of vertical restraints such as customer assignments and 
exclusive dealing stipulations.  The distortions that are an unwanted consequence 
of these sorts of  stipulations lead to further  manufacturer-  and  wholesaler-initiated 
stipulations  on  pricing  and  shipment  quantities,  which  are  tolerated  by  lax 
enforcement of antimonopoly laws. 
  Some of  the fundamental forces accounting  for  Japan’s proliferation of small 
stores are changing.  For example, car ownership increased dramatically during the 
1990s and the average size of dwelling also is steadily increasing. Probably as a 
result, in the 1990s grocery supermarkets and general merchandise super stores 
increased in number in Japan even as the overall number of stores steadily declined. 
Changes in implementation of the Large Store Law introduced in 1994 and its ultimate 
repeal and replacement with the Large Scale Retail Store Location Law in 2000 also 
have contributed to changes in the number and composition of Japan’s stores. 
  Government  policies  shape  the  economy,  but  the  reverse  also  is  true. 
Regulations emerge from a political process in which economic forces operate (Becker 
1983).  In Japan as elsewhere, the economy has shaped regulations, and regulation 
has reinforced inherent tendencies rather than fundamentally altered them. 
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 Table 1 





Japan  Indicator 
 
Small stores 
  6.1  11.2  Stores per 1000 persons (US 1996, Japan 1997)
1 
  11.7  5.1  Workers per store (US 1992, Japan 1997) 
 
a31,830  18,709  Number of typical supermarkets (in Japan, called food 
specialty super stores) (US 2000, Japan 1999)
2 
 
b4,143  832  Average store's floor space in m2 (US 2000, Japan 1999)
2 




Long and Complex Wholesale Marketing Channels 
      Percentage of labor force employed in: 
  4.1  8.0  Wholesaling (1990-93) 
  3.8  5.9  Wholesaling (1996-97 Japan, 1997 US) 
  11.4  10.4  Retailing (1993) 
  10.9  11.2  Retailing (1996-97 Japan, 1997 US) 
      
      Percentage of wholesale sales to other wholesalers:
3 
  25  42  1985-86 
  ..  5  1997 
 
Notes and sources:  Data are from Table 2 except as indicated. 
1  The UK had 3.4 in 1994 
2  Census of Commerce of Japan and (US) Food Marketing Institute. 
3  Census of Commerce of Japan and (for US) Ito and Maruyama 1991 
a  Stores with annual sales of $2 million or more. 










a  Share of distribution in   
 
value-added to GDP 
total 
employment 
Share of retail 
in total 




























..  ..  ..  13.5  10.2  3.4  15.9  21.1  9.7  10.0  Luxembourg 
93  3.3  15.4  12.8  10.7  ..  17.1  16.4  11.3  10.0  United Kingdom 
96  3.7  8.4  12.8  11.9  4.3  14.4  13.4  7.5  6.6  Austria 
92  4.0  10.8  ..  10.8  ..  20.8  17.4  13.1  9.9  Australia 92 
96  4.9  6.7  7.8  10.0  4.1  11.3  15.5  8.3  8.2  Germany 
93  4.9  6.5  8.3  9.5  ..  11.9  12.9  6.9  4.6  Sweden 
96  5.0  0.9  16.0  14.4  5.4  12.5  ..  4.8  4.3  Turkey 
92  6.1  11.7  15.7  13.6
e 6 . 7
e  15.5  14.7
e  11.4  10.9
e  United States 
95  6.3  5.8  10.7  11.5  3.8  10.8  15.9  7.8  6.9  Denmark 
96  6.6  3.7  12.2  9.2  4.0  13.8  13.8  9.3  7.2  France 
96  6.7  13.3  10.7  10.8  3.7  16.4  15.0  13.6  8.5  Czech Republic 
90  6.7a  ..  8.9  ..  ..  11.9  13.6  6.4  7.0  Iceland 
85  6.8  8.3  10.0  9.3  ..  16.4  18.7  10.4  12.7  Canada 85 
96  7.4  5.0  12.7  12.0  3.7  16.2  15.1  12.3  6.9  Netherlands 
97  7.6  2.5  8.4  9.4  3.1  12.5  11.9  6.7  6.0  Finland 
96  7.7  6.5  14.7  ..  ..  13.9  ..  10.6  9.4  Switzerland 
96  7.8  5.3  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  European community 
96  9.3  4.6  9.7  9.8  ..  13.9  15.2  6.0  8.8  Norway 
90  9.5  4.4  15.2  ..  ..  12.4  15.3  10.0  6.8  New Zealand 
96  9.8  2.6  15.3  12.6  2.9  19.3  17.3  10.3  7.6  Italy 
97  11.2  5.1  12.5  11.8  5.0
d  18.4  17.1  10.4  11.2  JAPAN 
97  12.1  1.5  10.8  10.2  4.7  12.4  13.9  11.5  10.7  Hungary 
93  13.0  13.2  ..  15.1  ..  14.9  ..  ..  15.2  Mexico  93 
96  13.7  1.9  ..  10.9  ..  15.9  13.3  7.3  12.7  Belgium 
92  14.2  2.7  14.2  13.3  ..  16.7  22.3  11.0  12.8  Spain 
97  14.4  2.5  7.9  ..  ..  14.3  ..  11.8  9.6  Ireland 
96  15.2  2.4  8.9  13.3  4.4  16.4  17.2  5.2  8.4  Portugal 
93  17.6  3.1  9.6  13.1  6.5  15.5  14.4  9.3  15.6  Greece  93 
97  18.5  2.2  11.7  ..  ..  22.0  ..  ..  9.2  Korea  85 
97  24.8  1.0  18.9  18.4  ..  16.4  13.2  5.2  7.4  Poland 
 
1  Value added to GDP by retail sector. 
Sources: 
a  OECD Regulation Database except as noted. 
b  Pilat (1997), Table 2.1, p.17. 
c  Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001), Table 1, p. 256. 
d  McKinsey Global Institute (2000), (Retail(, exhibit 1. 
e  Statistical Abstract of the United States Table 3 
Factors in Retail Density, 1998
1 




























(US$)  Country 
0.5  3.4
a  374.2  89  15.7  47.1  20,640  21,400  Utd Kingdom 
0.6
b  3.7  479.9  65  9.2  38.3  22,740  26,850  Austria 
..  4.0  472.3  85  88.0  110.5  20,130  20,300  Australia 
0.5  4.9  507.6  87  18.9  28.9  20,810  25,850  Germany 
0.6b  4.9  426.1  83  21.2  38.0  19,480  25,620  Sweden 
1.3  5.1a  63.8  73  27.8  15.7  ..  3,160  Turkey 
0.5  5.8a  480.6  77  96.8  280.9  29,340  29,340  United State 
..  6.3  354.2  86  6.6  56.2  23,830  33,260  Denmark 
0.7  6.6  455.8  75  23.5  92.1  22,320  24,940  France 
..  6.7  510.9  92  10.1  62.0  22,830  28,010  Iceland 
0.5  6.8  440.8  77  99.9  121.2  24,050  20,020  Canada 
1.0  6.8a  358.0  66  8.9  41.1  ..  5,040  Czech Rep 
0.7  7.4  566.3  89  6.4  100.6  21,620  24,760  Netherlands 
0.7b  7.6  388.7  64  18.4  54.0  20,270  24,110  Finland 
0.6  7.7  476.5  62  6.4  37.6  26,620  40,080  Switzerland 
0.6  9.3  405.9  74  18.0  88.9  24,290  34,330  Norway 
0.5  9.5  440.5  87  16.5  99.7  15,840  14,700  New Zealand 
0.8b  9.8  538.2  67  17.3  50.7  20,200  20,250  Italy 
0.6b  11.2a  395.1  79  19.4  163.8  23,180  32,380  JAPAN 
0.5  12.1  234.2  66  9.6  32.2  ..  4,510  Hungary 
1.4  13.0  97.8  74  44.2  45.9  8,190  3,970  Mexico 
0.5b  13.7  437.1  97  5.7  45.0  23,480  25,380  Belgium 
0.7b  14.2  389.2  77  22.5  81.6  16,060  14,080  Spain 
..  14.4  266.8  58  8.4  31.1  18,340  18,340  Ireland 
0.7  15.2  308.0  61  9.6  36.3  14,380  10,690  Portugal 
..  17.6  254.9  60  11.5  93.2  13,010  11,650  Greece 
1.1  18.5  163.4  84  10.0  46.1  12,270  7,970  Korea 
2.0  24.8  229.7  65  18.0  40.8  6,740  3,900  Poland 
Notes and Sources. 
1  Or nearest year for which data are available. 
2  Stores per 1000 inhabitants. (Table 2, except as noted.) 
3  Rooms per person. United Nations Statistics Division, social indicators homepage, 
(except as noted). 
4  Such vehicles per 1000 inhabitants. (Somusho tokei kyoku 2001, Table 8-2.) 
5  Urban population as percentage of total. (World Bank 2001, p 232 Table 2.) 
6  Square root of the country's area (1000km(). (World Bank 2001, p 232 Table 2.) 
7  GNP per capita adjusted to purchasing power parity. 
8  Name of variable in regression analysis. 
a  Using  data  from  Boylaud  and  Nicoletti  (2001)  p  256  Table  1:  Czech  Rep,  Japan,  Turkey 
are 1997; United Kingdom is 1994; United States is 1996. 
b  Somusho tokei kyoku 2001, p 296 Table 13-6 (rooms per dwelling) divided by p 32 




OLS Regressions Explaining International Variation in Density of Stores 
 
Dependent variable = ln STORES 
 
Coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses 
 
With CRWDNG 
        Japan 
Without CRWDNG 
        Japan  
Variable: 
  excluded    excluded   
      
3.4  3.5  5.6  5.6  Constant 
(1.9)  (1.8)  (5.2)  (5.1)   
      
-0.4  -0.4  -1.4  -1.4  URBAN 
(-0.4)  (-0.4)  (-1.7)  (-1.7)   
      
-0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.6  ln CARS 
(-1.0)  (-1.0)  (-2.9)  (-2.8)   
      
0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  ln TRUCKS 
(2.1)  (1.9)  (2.6)  (2.4)   
      
-0.3  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  ln LENGTH 
(-2.0)  (-1.9)  (-2.8)  (-2.8)   
      
0.6  0.6  -  -  ln CRWDG 
(1.5)  (1.5)       
      
23  22  28  27  Number of obsevarvations 
0.40  0.39  0.40  0.41  R
2 
      
-  11.8  -  11.7  Predicted value of STORES for Japan 
-  (0.08)  -  (0.13)  t-test  statistic  for  difference  from 





Number of Large Stores in Japan, 1985-99 
 
  Large stores  All stores 
  class 1
1  class 2
2  total  total 
   %
3   %
3  %
3   %
3 
1985  3,662  -  9,624  -  13,286  -  1,628,644  - 
1988  4,027  3.2  10,605  3.3  14,632  3.3  1,619,752  -0.2 
1991  4,429  3.2  11,082  1.5  15,511  2.0  1,591,223  -0.6 
1994  3,351  -8.9  14,292  8.8  17,643  4.4  1,499,948  -1.9 
1997  4,350  9.1  17,542  7.1  21,892  7.5  1,419,696  -1.8 
1999  -  -  -  -  23,897  4.5  1,406,884  -0.5 
 
1  Class 1 includes larger stores (over 3000 m2 in most regions, 6000 m2 in selected 
wards of Tokyo and other large cities). 
2  Class  2  covers  remaining  large  stores.  In  the  1999  Census  of  Commerce the 
distinctions were abandoned. 
3  Annual average percentage change since prior census. 
 




Regulations Distorting Distribution Sector Resource Allocation 
 
Regulation 
Nature  of  effect  on 
distribution sector  Comment 
Large  Store  Law 
1974-2000. 
Severely limited number of 
stores with large floor space, 
including department stores 
and general merchandise 
super-stores, contributing to 
survival of small traditional 
stores. 
 
Repealed in 1998 but in effect until 






Enacted with repeal of the 
Large Store Law. 
Vests prefectures and 
municipalities with authority to 
limit large stores (1000m2 or 
greater). Supposedly criteria is to 
be confined to environmental 
factors such as noise and traffic 





The Road Vehicles Act (revised 
1995) mandates comprehensive 
safety inspections of private 
passenger vehicles every two 
years beginning with the third 
year the car is in operation. 
This usually entails purchase of 
numerous replacement parts. The 
cost  inhibits  car  ownership  and  thus 
helps perpetuate the advantage of 
near-by small neighborhood stores 






















tionals   
              Share of sales: 
-  7  7  34  3  10  37  Japan 1988 
-  8  12  36  4  9  30  Japan 1997 
-  15  24  35  3  7  17  United States 1995 
             
              Share of labor hours: 
-  4  8  23  2  8  55  Japan 1997 
-  14  21  35  3  8  19  United States 1995 
             
              Value-added: 
25.5a  2.2  3.0  12.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  Japan 1997
2 
50  106  73  102  96  48  19  Per hour Japan 1997
3 
50  93  60  84  88  70  33  As percentage of US 
 
1  Discounters and general merchandise stores. 
2  In trillion yen. 
3  US retail average = 100. 
a  5% of GDP. 
 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2000), p 27 Exhibit 4, p 28 Exhibit 5.  Categories 
of stores do not correspond exactly to those of the Census of Commerce of 
Japan.  Presumably this is because of the need for correspondence between 









2  Product mix
2, other requirements  Category 
Self-service
3    
-  At least 10%, but no more than 70%, of 
sales in each category. 
 
General Merchandise super 
stores 
>250
a  At least 70% of sales in a category.
 
Specialty super stores 
30-250
b  Includes food. Open at least 14 
hrs/day. 
Convenience stores 
-  Self-service stores not in the other 3 
categories. 




-  At least 10%, but no more than 70%, of 
sales in each category. 
 
Department stores 
-  At least 90% of sales in 1 category.
 
Specialty stores 




-  Non-self-service stores not in the 




1  As established by the Census of Commerce of Japan for 1997 and later years. 
2  Within three categories: clothing, food, and living (jun-kanren) 
3  A store is self-service if at least half the floor space is devoted to sale of 
merchandise in prepackaged or final form, at a price marked on the product, to 
customers who move freely about the store with a cart or hand-basket, and who pay 
no fee to enter the store.  
a  Before 1997, threshold was 500m2. 
b  Before 1997, range was 50-250m2. 
 Table 9 
Characteristics of Stores in Japan, 1985-99 
  1985  1988  1991  1994  1997  1999   
All Retail Stores 
  1,628,644  1,619,752  1,591,223  1,499,948  1,419,696  1,406,884  Number 
  3.9  4.2  4.4  4.9  5.2  5.7  Employees
1 
  -  -  79  93  105  111  Area (sq m
2) 
  62  71  88  96  104  102  Sales
2 
Department Stores 
  438  433  455  463  476  394  Number 
  431  446  456  444  392  427  Employees
1 
  -  -  15,063  16,340  17,133  19,134  Area (sq m
2) 
  17,762  20,930  25,086  22,981  22,416  24,633  Sales
2 
General Merchandise Super Stores 
  1,389  1,478  1,549  1,804  1,888  1,670  Number 
  138  136  142  151  160  192  Employees
1 
  -  -  5,659  6,316  7,166  8,020  Area (sq m
2) 
  4,258  4,491  5,268  5,175  5,274  5,299  Sales
2 
Specialty Super Stores 
  5,873  6,397  7,130  9,354  11,656  14,455  Number 
  -  -  *20,827  *25,171  *32,209  *35,531  Number
3 
  520  571  618  849  *4,549  *4,780    Clothing 
  4,707  4,877  5,185  6,231  *17,623  *18,707    Food  
  646  949  1,327  2,274  *10,037  *12,044    Living 
  37  38  37  39  *24  *29  Employees
1 
  -  -  -  1,207  *731  *840  Area (sq m
2) 
   983  1,000  1,122  1,115  *635  *668  Sales
2 
Convenience Stores 
  29,236  34,550  41,847  48,405  33,167  37,025  Number 
  -  -  *23,837  *28,226  *36,631  *39,628  Number
3 
  7  9  8  10  *11  *14  Employees
1 
  -  -  *94  *98  *99  *103  Area (sq m
2) 
  116  145  167  172  *143  *155  Sales
2 
Other Super Stores 
  59,643  53,834  67,473  80,036  103,273  67,476  Number 
  -  -  *72,027  *84,878  *120,721  *86,367  Number
3 
  6  7  6  6  *4  *6  Employees
1 
  -  -  -  128  *89  *110  Area (sq m
2) 
  124  144  143  132  *83  *98  Sales
2 
Specialty Stores 
  1,004,883  1,007,756  1,000,166  930,143  839,969  920,277  Number 
  149,246  151,370  154,656  147,478  126,383  134,329    Clothing 
  290,789  293,203  283,570  263,681  230,163  249,287    Food 
  564,848  563,183  561,940  518,984  483,423  536,661    Living 
  3  4  4  4  4  5  Employees
1 
  -  -  53  61  63  63  Area (sq m
2) 
  47  51  65  66  71  68  Sales
2 
Semi-specialty Stores 
  524,885  513,338  470,289  429,108  385,748  319,685  Number 
  74,232  78,608  76,903  65,733  62,882  54,928    Clothing 
  271,593  253,352  224,756  185,509  154,736  131,465    Food 
  177,644  179,715  166,740  175,857  168,130  133,292    Living 
  3  3  4  4  4  4  Employees
1 
  -  -  62  69  74  76  Area (sq m
2) 
  47  54  67  76  82  75  Sales
2 
 
1  Average number per store. 
2  Average annual sales in million yen. 
3  Using 1997 definitions, for which see text. 




Composition of Total Sales Across Formats of Stores, 1985-99. 
 
(in percents) 
1985  1988  1991  1994  1997
a 1 9 9 9
a  
7.6  7.9  8.1  7.4  7.2  6.7  Department 
5.8  5.8  5.8  6.5  6.7  6.2  General Merchandise Super 
5.7  5.6  5.7  7.3  13.8  16.5  Specialty Super 
3.3  4.4  5.0  5.8  3.5  4.3  Convenience 
7.3  6.8  6.9  7.4  6.8  5.9  Other Super 
46.0  45.2  45.9  42.6  40.4  43.5  Specialty 
24.0  24.2  22.4  22.9  21.3  16.7  Semi-specialty 
0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.3  Other 
 
a Changes in definitions of specialty super stores, convenience stores, and other 
super stores in 1997 increases specialty super stores relative to the other two 
formats and makes the series for the three formats discontinuous. Data using the 
new definitions are in italics. 
 














1965  22   
1970  85  30.7 
1975  154  12.7 
1980  202  5.6 
1985  230  2.6 
1990  291  4.8 
1995  360  4.4 
1998  394  3.1 
 
1  Passenger cars per 1000 persons. 
2  Average annual perentage change from previous entry. 
 




Changes in Japanese Dwellings, 1965-98 
 
 
Rooms per  Persons per  Area (m
2) per 
  dwelling  dwelling  room  dwelling  person 
Change  in  area 
per person
1 
1963  3.82  4.43  1.16  72.52  16.36   
1968  3.84  3.96  1.03  73.86  18.63  2.6 
1973  4.15  3.63  0.87  77.14  21.26  2.7 
1978  4.52  3.47  0.77  80.28  23.17  1.7 
1983  4.73  3.35  0.71  85.92  25.69  2.1 
1988  4.86  3.21  0.66  89.29  27.86  1.6 
1993  4.85  3.02  0.62  91.92  30.46  1.8 
1998  4.79  2.83  0.59  92.43  32.70  1.4 
 
1  Average annual percentage change between years shown. 
 
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook. 
  
Table 13 
Measures of Population Density, 1965-95. 
 
  Dense districts
1  Overall density 
 p o p
2  Area
3 a v e
4  change
5 
1965  48.1  1.23  10,263  - 
1970  53.5  1.71  8,678  -3.3 
1975  57.0  2.19  7,712  -2.3 
1980  59.7  2.65  6,983  -2.0 
1985  60.6  2.80  6,938  -0.1 
1990  63.2  3.11  6,661  -0.8 
1995  64.7  3.24  6,630  -0.1 
 
1 Densely inhabited districts are contiguous census districts with high population 
density (in principle, 4000 inhabitants or more per km2) within the boundary of 
a city, ward, town, or village constituting an agglomeration of 5000 or more 
inhabitants. 
2 Population  of  densely  inhabited  districts  as  a  percentage  of  Japan's  total 
population. 
3 Densely inhabited districts as a percentage of Japan's total area. 
4 Overall population denisty per km2. 
5 Annual average percentage change in density since previous census. 
 
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook. 
 Table 14 
OLS Log Linear Regressions Explaining the Numbers of Stores of Different Kinds 
Per Person, with Fixed Effects for Each of Japan(s 47 Prefectures 
Dependent variable is number of stores per 1000 people 
Coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) for different classes of stores   
 















Independent  variable 
names 
(except last row) 
-0.17  0.57  0.19  0.46  0.72  0.89  -0.23  -0.35  Passenger cars 
(-7.99)  (1.99)  (1.06)  (3.24)  (4.66)  (4.21)  (-7.07)  (-8.64)    Per 1000 persons 
          
-0.01  -2.92  3.05  -0.15  0.74  -0.83  0.45  -0.60  Dwelling floor space 
(-0.09)  (-1.51)  (2.51)  (-0.15)  (0.65)  (-0.54)  (2.03)  (-2.16)    Per person (m
2) 
          
-0.37  2.68  0.00  -0.29  0.73  0.32  -0.67  -0.62  1000 Persons  per  km
2 in 
(-4.12)  (2.22)  (0.00)  (-0.44)  (1.02)  (0.33)  (-4.85)  (-3.58)    dense areas
2 
          
-0.36  0.42  -2.21  2.27  2.11  -2.75  0.25  -0.45  Fraction  of  population 
(-2.09)  (0.18)  (-1.52)  (1.74)  (1.47)  (-1.40)  (0.94)  (-1.37)    in dense areas2 
          
0.01  0.23  -0.04  -0.16  0.06  -0.21  -0.01  -0.01  Class 1 Large Stores
3 
(0.88)  (1.48)  (-0.41)  (-1.61)  (0.57)  (-1.39)  (-0.81)  (-0.62)    Per 1000 Persons 
          
-0.10  -0.18  0.39  0.42  0.02  -0.08  -0.19  -0.11  Class 2 Large Stores
3 
(-6.57)  (-0.85)  (3.01)  (3.37)  (0.17)  (-0.43)  (-7.89)  (-3.84)    Per 1000 Persons 
          
0.98  0.71  0.84  0.98  0.98  0.96  0.96  0.98  R
2 
 
  All variables are in natural logs except the fraction of population residing 
in densely inhabited districts. 
  Number of observations (except for specialty super stores and convenience 
stores) = 235 = 47 prefectures X 5 years of observations. 
  Sample = 5 successive census of commerce reports 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 
1997, by prefecture, except as noted. 
  Coefficients on prefecture dummies are not reported. 
 
1 No observations for 1997.   
2 Densely inhabited districts are contiguous census districts with high population 
density (in principle, 4000 inhabitants or more per km2) within the boundary of 
a city, ward, town, or village constituting an agglomeration of 5000 or more 
inhabitants. 
3 Class 1 and class 2 large stores are defined in Table 6. 
 